I have heard the Indian case for a permanent Security Council seat often enough to recite it: the world’s largest democracy, an ancient civilisation, a major contributor of blue helmets. All true, yet none of it has moved the five countries already seated there. They weren’t chosen for being admirable; they were in the room in 1945, won the war, and wrote the rules that keep them there.
The Charter gives the Council primary responsibility for peace. Article 27 adds the catch: on any serious matter, all five permanent members must agree. One ‘no’ and the discussion is over. If you judge the veto only by the danger it was designed to prevent, i.e war between great powers, then, eighty years on, it has done its job. But that success does not tell the whole story.
Through September 2025, the Council’s own votes record 318 vetoes, killing 264 proposals. Russia and the Soviet Union cast 155, the United States 94, Britain 30, China 21, and France 18. Britain and France have not used their vetoes since 1989. Since then, the veto has mostly served as a shield for self-interest or allies: American votes protecting Israel, Russian and Chinese votes shielding Syria, and earlier Western vetoes shielding apartheid South Africa. The Council falls silent when one of the five is part of the story.
The Korean War in 1950 proceeded only because the Soviets boycotted the chamber. Iraq was authorised in 1991, but in 2003 Washington and London invaded without UN backing when they grew impatient. Article 27 says parties to a dispute should abstain under Chapter VI. Yet in February 2022, Russia judged a draft resolution concerning its own invasion and voted it down.
I nearly left India’s vote on Ukraine out of that ledger because it complicates a tidier argument. During our two-year term, eleven members supported a text asking Russia to stop and withdraw. We abstained, alongside China and the UAE. T.S. Tirumurti said we were deeply disturbed. Soon after, at Munich, S. Jaishankar brought principles and interests into alignment. It sounded true, which is the difficulty: it sits uneasily with the idea that a permanent India would follow the Charter when doing so became awkward.
Peacekeeping is firmer ground for us, though we tend to polish the story. Developed after the Charter, peacekeeping helped end wars in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, but its failures are just as clear. In Rwanda, the Council cut a mission that had asked for more, contributing to 800,000 deaths. In Srebrenica, a designated “safe area” was left undefended, resulting in 8,000 murders. The Council does only what the five are willing to bear.
The financial ledger is just as sobering. Peacekeeping cost $5.6 billion in 2024-25, with the United States paying 26.95 per cent and China 18.69 per cent. Japan and Germany, neither of them holding a veto, pay more than Britain, France, or Russia. The P5 are charged extra for their “special responsibility,” but the soldiers come from elsewhere. India ranked third in total deployments, with 5,211 military personnel. Since the 1950s, nearly 300,000 Indians have served, and 182 have died. What we have not been is a leading financial contributor; Japan and Germany rank ahead of us there.
We cannot claim to have been the Council’s moral conscience.
In 1956, Delhi spoke loudly about Suez while remaining quiet about Hungary; our abstention on Ukraine belongs to that same pragmatic tradition. The moment I would rather defend came in July 2003, largely because it was inconvenient. Washington asked for an Indian division in Iraq. Vajpayee’s cabinet committee refused, with Yashwant Sinha noting that troops required an explicit UN mandate. For once, the Council was treated as binding, even when a friend wanted otherwise.
I do not expect any of this to win us a seat. A larger Council risks becoming a slower one. In 2005, India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil tried to address this by offering to defer using any new veto, but the draft was never put to a vote. African states, which bear the brunt of Council agendas without a permanent seat, are naturally wary. Article 108 also makes reform nearly impossible: any change requires a two-thirds majority and ratification by every permanent member, each of whom can veto the loss of its own power.
Washington grows cautious when the veto is on the table; Moscow wants its absolute ‘no’; Beijing opposes a permanent Japan or India. So I would not end by demanding anything. The Council prevented the war it was created to fear, even as it paralysed itself over conflicts involving its masters. India is vast, has supplied the backbone of field enforcement where decisions matter, and remains aligned with no P5 bloc. Keeping us outside was understandable in 1945; today, it is simply a thin argument. That is as far as I can take it without joining the speech I began by complaining about.
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