Something unusual is happening inside the National Conference. Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi is no longer behaving like a mildly disgruntled parliamentarian who occasionally disagrees with his leadership. He is challenging the political direction of his own party, questioning its leadership, accusing it of abandoning its promises and now preparing to resign both from the National Conference and from the Lok Sabha.
So an uncomfortable question deserves to be asked: Is Ruhullah merely an angry rebel—or has someone in New Delhi discovered in him the perfect instrument with which to fracture the National Conference?
Before conspiracy theorists begin celebrating, there is an important qualification. There is no publicly established evidence that Ruhullah has been “planted” by New Delhi. But interestingly, the allegation is no longer coming merely from drawing-room gossip. NC legislator Sajad Shaheen has publicly called Ruhullah’s rebellion part of a “Delhi plot” to split the party and alleged that the MP is being shown political “green pastures.”
That changes the question.
Why would Delhi need to manufacture another conventional opponent to the NC when an internal rebellion could inflict far greater damage?
The BJP attacking Omar Abdullah strengthens Omar among sections of his traditional constituency. Ruhullah attacking Omar is different. He attacks from inside the ideological house. He can tell NC voters that he has not abandoned the party’s original promise—the party leadership has. That is infinitely more damaging.
Ruhullah’s principal charge is devastatingly simple. The NC asked for votes after promising to fight for restoration of Articles 370 and 35A. After forming the government, its emphasis increasingly shifted towards restoration of statehood. Ruhullah argues that limiting the political objective to statehood effectively accepts the constitutional arrangement created after August 2019. In his letter to Farooq Abdullah, he even asked whether Article 370 had been included in the manifesto merely for electoral benefit.
That is not an opposition leader attacking the NC.
That is an NC man interrogating the NC with its own manifesto in his hand.
And that is precisely what makes the “Delhi theory” seductive.
But there is another dimension to that theory which should not be dismissed merely because Ruhullah attacks New Delhi.
Would a Delhi-backed Ruhullah necessarily sound pro-Delhi? Perhaps not.
If the purpose of any political operation were to create a credible challenger to the Abdullahs inside Kashmir, openly displaying sympathy for the BJP or the Centre would almost defeat the purpose. A politician perceived to be close to the BJP would struggle to occupy the very political space from which the National Conference can be damaged most effectively.
The perfect challenger would almost have to look exactly the opposite.
He would have to sound more Kashmiri than the Abdullahs, more uncompromising on Article 370 than Omar Abdullah, harsher towards the BJP than the National Conference leadership and sufficiently rebellious to convince people that he was sacrificing political comfort for principle.
Only then could he potentially take political space away from the NC without automatically driving those voters back into the Abdullah camp.
In that sense, Ruhullah’s strident criticism of Delhi does not, by itself, logically disprove the theory.
Political parties and establishments have historically used far more complicated methods than openly promoting friendly politicians. Political credibility often depends precisely upon appearing independent of the force one is alleged to benefit.
But there is a dangerous trap here too.
If Ruhullah praises Delhi and that is called evidence of Delhi’s hand, while Ruhullah attacks Delhi and that too is called evidence because his hostility is supposedly camouflage, then the theory becomes impossible to disprove. At that point it ceases to be investigation and becomes conspiracy.
Therefore, the question cannot be settled by speeches alone.
It has to be tested against conduct, connections, timing, political facilitation and, above everything else, beneficiaries.
Who ultimately benefits if the National Conference splits?
Delhi certainly does.
But benefiting from an event does not prove that one engineered it.
Has Ruhullah received unusual political access? Has anyone facilitated his rebellion? Are legislators being encouraged to migrate towards him? Is there evidence of intermediaries, political protection, financing or coordination? Does a new formation suddenly appear around him with organisational resources that could not ordinarily have materialised overnight?
Those would constitute evidence.
Angry speeches against Omar Abdullah do not.
And perhaps the most revealing question will only be answered after the rupture: Where does Ruhullah go next? Who goes with him? Who helps him? And whose political interests does his eventual destination serve?
There are, therefore, at least four possibilities: Ruhullah could have been planted; he could have been subsequently encouraged; Delhi could simply be exploiting a genuine rebellion it never created; or the entire revolt could be completely independent.
The third possibility deserves particular attention.
Political establishments do not necessarily have to manufacture every fracture they benefit from. Sometimes they merely recognise one, allow it to grow and quietly enjoy the consequences.
Ruhullah could therefore be entirely sincere in his opposition to August 2019, entirely genuine in his anger with the National Conference, and yet his rebellion could simultaneously become extremely useful to New Delhi.
That distinction—between planting, encouraging, exploiting and merely benefiting—may ultimately be far more important than the simplistic question of whether Ruhullah is somebody’s “man.”
If New Delhi wanted the National Conference weakened, it could hardly ask for a better political situation. Omar Abdullah governs. Every compromise becomes his responsibility. Every unfulfilled promise becomes his burden. Meanwhile, Ruhullah remains free to occupy the ideological ground Omar vacates.
One governs reality. The other champions expectation.
One asks Delhi for statehood. The other asks what happened to Article 370.
One must explain compromises. The other only has to expose them.
But here the conspiracy theory runs into serious trouble.
Ruhullah has repeatedly taken positions distinctly inconvenient for the Centre. He refused to join the NC’s Delhi protest focused on statehood because he argued that the mandate was for Article 370. More importantly, when Omar Abdullah alleged attempts to poach NC legislators, Ruhullah publicly opposed horse-trading and attempts to break political parties and said the government should be allowed to complete its term.
That is strange behaviour for somebody supposedly assigned to dismantle the NC.
Then came Farooq Abdullah’s challenge: resign and discover how much of your popularity belongs to you and how much belongs to the National Conference.
Ruhullah accepted.
He has said he intends to resign from Parliament and the party on November 3.
Now politics becomes interesting.
If Ruhullah actually resigns, contests again without the NC and wins, the political consequences could be enormous. It would establish that an alternative centre of Kashmiri politics can emerge outside the Abdullah family while speaking a vocabulary even more uncompromising than the National Conference’s.
If he loses badly, Farooq Abdullah’s argument will be vindicated: Ruhullah was powerful because the NC made him powerful.
Perhaps that is why November 3 could become more important than all the present verbal fireworks.
But there is another possibility the NC may find much harder to digest.
What if Delhi did not create Ruhullah at all?
What if the National Conference created him?
Political parties produce rebels when the distance between what they promise and what they practise becomes too wide. Ruhullah’s rebellion works precisely because he is exploiting that distance. He does not need New Delhi to write his script when the NC’s 2024 manifesto provides enough material.
His latest attack goes even further. During the Vande Mataram controversy, he accused his own party of abandoning political battles and falling in line with positions associated with the BJP and RSS. The confrontation is therefore no longer confined to statehood versus Article 370; it is becoming an argument about what the National Conference actually stands for.
And therein lies the real danger for the Abdullahs.
A political party can fight an enemy.
It finds it much harder to fight a mirror.
Ruhullah is holding one before the National Conference and asking: Where is the party that asked Kashmiris for their votes in 2024?
Delhi undoubtedly benefits from an NC weakened by internal warfare. But benefiting from a rebellion is not proof of engineering it.
So, Sajad Shaheen and others alleging a Delhi conspiracy now carry a responsibility. If Ruhullah has been cultivated, encouraged or politically sponsored from New Delhi, produce the evidence. Kashmir has had enough politics conducted through whispers, insinuations and invisible hands.
And if there is no evidence?
Then the conclusion is considerably more embarrassing.
The Abdullahs may discover that the man they suspect New Delhi of planting inside their party was planted there by their own politics.
They gave him the platform.
Their manifesto gave him the ammunition.
Their compromises gave him the issue.
And Farooq Abdullah’s challenge may now give him the opportunity to discover whether he can survive without them.
The real question, therefore, may not be “Has Delhi planted Ruhullah to break the National Conference?”
It may be:
“Why did the National Conference become so vulnerable that one man could make that theory believable?”
BOX
If Ruhullah Is Backed by Delhi: Who Gains, Who Loses?
| Player | Gains | Loses / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| New Delhi | NC weakened; Valley vote fragmented; less bargaining power for Omar | Backlash if role exposed; NC may reunify against Delhi |
| BJP | Strongest Valley rival divided; benefits without winning Valley votes | Ruhullah may revive harder Article 370 politics |
| Ruhullah | Independent identity; anti-establishment space; possible new political role | Loses NC cadre, symbol and organisational machinery |
| Omar Abdullah | Removes an internal critic if Ruhullah exits | Loses ideological ground; every compromise becomes Ruhullah’s weapon |
| Farooq Abdullah | Can test whether NC is bigger than Ruhullah | A Ruhullah victory outside NC badly dents Abdullah authority |
| National Conference | Failed rebellion could strengthen party discipline | Vote split; seats become vulnerable; internal defections possible |
| PDP | Gets space if NC fragments | Ruhullah may occupy PDP’s own anti-NC, Article 370 space |
| Congress | Greater bargaining power with a weakened NC | Gets trapped between national politics and Valley radicalisation |
| Smaller Valley parties | More space in multi-cornered contests | Could be eclipsed by a new Ruhullah pole |
| Kashmiri voter | More competition; NC forced to explain itself | More fragmentation, less collective political leverage |
Postscript: Delhi does not need Ruhullah to join the BJP. It only needs him to take enough political space away from the National Conference. And the strategic gain is not turning Ruhullah saffron; it is turning one National Conference into two competing Kashmiri centres of power.
