New Delhi: In a relief for international water sports coach Bilquis Mir, the Supreme Court on Thursday set aside a High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh order and directed the J&K administration to issue her a no objection certificate and relieving order on or before September 15.
The ruling paves the way for Mir, a physical education teacher in the J&K Youth Services Department, to join as chief coach and assist the Indian National Kayaking and Canoeing Team for the Asian Games in Japan beginning September 19.
A bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M Pancholi allowed the appeal filed by the Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association against the high court’s August 11 judgment. The apex court quashed the Jammu and Kashmir government’s order dated June 19, 2026, which had denied her permission citing pending departmental inquiries and service conditions.
Emphasising the importance of time management in competitive athletics, the bench said “sports administration necessarily involves strict timelines. Selection, training camps, qualifying events and international competitions operate upon fixed schedules which cannot be postponed to await completion of ordinary administrative processes”.
Mir was represented by advocate Khowaja Siddiqui while the Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association was represented by senior advocate Najmi Wazziri during the hearing.
Addressing the limits of executive power, the top court said, “The absence of an absolute right to obtain a favourable administrative decision cannot be equated with the absence of a right to fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary and timely consideration of a request, which in our considered opinion are two distinct propositions.”
Under the apex court’s directions, the Jammu and Kashmir administration must issue all requisite permissions by September 15, 2026, to enable Mir to join the national coaching camp and accompany the team to the Asian Games.
The court directed that the period of her absence for the national sporting assignment will not be treated as unauthorised absence.
The top court clarified that the judgment does not recognise any general right in a government employee to claim deputation or foreign travel, nor does it interfere with the state’s power to independently proceed with disciplinary inquiries against her in accordance with law.
In its 16-page judgement, the bench highlighted the consequences of bureaucratic delay and said “in a time-sensitive matter, delay may itself defeat the very purpose for which administrative power is required to be exercised. A decision rendered after the relevant opportunity has substantially or wholly passed cannot invariably cure an earlier failure to act…”
Mir was selected by the association in February 2026 to prepare the national team.
However, procedural delays by the state government resulted in her missing an earlier international assignment as Chief Finish Line Judge at the World Cup in Hungary in May.
Holding that a remand back to the authority at this late stage would amount to a denial of effective relief, the apex court granted direct relief to ensure her participation in the upcoming games.
It, however, left undisturbed the high court’s direction asking the Centre to frame an enforceable statutory framework for government employees who are outstanding sportspersons or coaches.
The top court noted that the high court misdirected itself by treating the arrangement as an ordinary service matter while failing to recognise the urgent, time-sensitive nature of a national sports assignment.
“The error in the impugned judgment lies in holding that the subsequent administrative order dated 19.06.2026 rendered the earlier delay inconsequential,” the bench said.
The top court also expressed firm disapproval of the Union Territory administration’s decision to issue a rejection order on June 19 while an interim court direction passed on May 6 was actively operating in favour of Mir.
“An order of a constitutional court, for so long as it remains operative, binds the parties to the proceeding,” the bench observed. “An executive authority cannot, during the subsistence of a judicial direction, render that direction ineffective merely by taking an administrative decision inconsistent with it.”
